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Entrepreneurial Entry: Which Institutions Matter?
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In this paper we explore the relationship between the individual decision to become an 
entrepreneur and the institutional context. We pinpoint the critical roles of property rights and 
the size of the state sector for entrepreneurial activity and test the relationships empirically by 
combining country-level institutional indicators for 44 countries with working age population 
survey data taken from the Global Enterprise Monitor. A methodological contribution is the 
use of factor analysis to reduce the statistical problems with the array of highly collinear 
institutional indicators. We find that the key institutional features that enhance entrepreneurial 
activity are indeed the rule of law and limits to the state sector. However, these results are 
sensitive to the level of development. 
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Existing research indicates that new firm entry
i generates beneficial churning in the 
economy, fosters innovation, economic change and development; enhances employment 
creation; and ensures more equitable income distributions (Hirschman 1958; Baumol 1990; 
Acs 2006). However, these benefits are not an automatic consequence of entrepreneurial 
activity, but rather depend on the institutional environment. Where institutions are “weak”, 
entrepreneurs are less likely to undertake new projects or may instead focus their energies on 
unproductive ones, with a resulting loss of efficiency (Glaeser et al., 2003; Johnson et al., 
1997; Baumol 1990). While there can be deficiencies in the institutional framework 
anywhere, it is normally argued that this problem is especially serious in emerging 
economies;  in particular, the literature has stressed the weak rule of law, and excessive state 
regulation (La Porta et al, 1999; Djankov et al, 2002).  Moreover, in spite of the importance 
of the institutional environment for entrepreneurship entry, the subject poses a challenge for 
both theoretical and empirical research. The former arises because the conceptual framework 
linking individual choices to become entrepreneurs with the institutional environment 
remains underdeveloped. Moreover, institutions are difficult to measure and the available 
measures are often highly correlated with each other, leading to serious specification 
dilemmas (Acemoglu and Johnson, 2005). However, in recent years a rich array of new 
institutional measures has been developed that allow the problem to be addressed more 
analytically.  
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 In our study, we compare the effects of institutions on individual entrepreneurial 
activity in the form of new business start-ups in 44 different countries. We include all start-
ups regardless of the legal form. In contrast, most existing studies focus on small enterprises 
requiring legal registration or on incorporated firms as a proxy for entrepreneurial activity. 
We also use data on the whole universe of potential entrepreneurs, rather than just of the 
existing business owners. This unique opportunity is offered through the Global Enterprise 
Monitor survey (GEM).   The impact of institutions can best be explored on the basis of 
cross-country variation (see Schaffer et al. (2006)), which is made possible by the GEM 
dataset. However, to date, most analyses using GEM data have focused on individual 
countries though Wennekers et al. (2005) and Van Stel et al. (2007) use country averages to 
explore institutional influences. The empirical novelty of this paper lies in merging individual 
and country-specific data as well as in the empirical methodology used. We start with a wide 
spectrum of institutional variables that allows for a comparative approach of all 44 countries 
contained in our analysis and by utilizing factor analysis prior to regression estimation 
models, we are able to obtain results that are more robust and address multicollinearity 
between the institutional measures, thereby avoiding the traps of ad hoc specifications based 
on an arbitrary exclusion of indicators. We also use institutional country-level variables as 
explanatory factors without being concerned with simultaneity bias, because the individual 
decision of a potential entrepreneur does not affect country-level institutions. Moreover, 
analysing across the whole universe of potential entrepreneurs enables us to overcome the 
limitation of selection bias prevalent in entrepreneurship studies.  
It has been widely argued that institutions play an important role in determining the 
scale and quality of entrepreneurship. However, the literature has not yet been able to address 
explicitly the impact of institutions on the choice of whether an individual will enter the 
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 market as an entrepreneur. Moreover, the relative significance of different institutions has 
been considered more rarely, and multicollinearity remains a problem. In this context, our 
paper provides the following key findings. We establish that two specific institutional 
dimensions – the rule of law, and a more limited state sector– are significantly associated 
with the entrepreneurial entry.  Given that entrepreneurial entry decreases with the level of 
development (though the effect is non-linear: the negative marginal effect decreases with the 
level of income per capita) we also show that the impact of institutions is conditional on the 
stage of development: for the richest 10%-20% of countries little is explained by institutional 
variation. 
This paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we provide a brief theoretical 
overview of the institutional approach as applied to entrepreneurship and discuss the main 
empirical studies analysing entrepreneurship development and institutions. Our approach to 
quantifying the institutional environment is outlined in the third section and the Global 
Enterprise Monitor dataset as well as our estimation methods in the fourth. Section 5 presents 
our results and the paper concludes with Section 6. 
 
2. Unbundling Institutions and Entrepreneurship: Theory and Empirics   
 
This section begins by briefly discussing how institutions may influence entrepreneurship 
development. This is followed by an overview of the most relevant empirical literature which 
helps to motivate our own research. 
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 2.1 Institutional theory 
According to North, entrepreneurs are the main agents of change (1997a). 
Organizations set up by entrepreneurs adapt their activities and strategies moulding them to 
fit the opportunities and limitations provided through the formal and informal institutional 
framework. Though ideally, formal rules are designed to facilitate exchange reducing 
transaction costs, they are also likely to affect individuals or groups in different ways. Since 
private interests may differ and individuals, who often have their narrow interests at heart, 
affect formal rules and institutions, the latter are not necessarily shaped in the interest of 
social well-being (North 1994; Olson, 2000).  
Correspondingly, formal and informal rules can be maintained even if they are 
inefficient (DiMaggio & Powell 1983; North 1990). There are several reasons for inefficient 
institutional outcomes.  First of all, even when they clash with new formal rules, informal 
rules have a tenacious ability to survive because they have become part of habitual behaviour 
(i.e. culture). In this sense, informal institutions provide a sense of stability. Second, informal 
institutions may change more slowly due to the influence of path dependence.  This occurs 
because institutional change is usually incremental and is seldom discontinuous (North 
1990:10). Thirdly, lock-in can occur as a result of a symbiotic relationship between existing 
institutions and the organizations that have evolved as a result of the incentive structure 
provided by those institutions (ibid. 1990:7). Even when the formal rules change, 
organizations which benefited from the outdated informal rules and which would lose their 
‘comparative advantage’ if they adopted new informal practices complementary to formal 
rule changes will continue to participate in detrimental informal rule practices in order to 
retain their position of power. 
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 North and Thomas (1973), Williamson (1987), Barzel (1997), Rodrik (2000), 
Acemoglu and Johnson (2005) and others have argued that property rights systems form the 
backbone of the modern set of institutions that characterize the market economy. In essence 
strong legal property rights (rule of law) support the broader development of economic 
property rights that are defined as “individual ability, in expected terms, to consume the good 
(or the services of the asset) directly or to consume it indirectly through exchange” (Barzel, 
1997, p.3). Accordingly, in recent institutional research, the focus shifts from the assignment 
of rights and certification to the institutional environmental conditions that make execution of 
these rights, especially exchange and other legal contracts based on the property rights, 
effective. One important issue relates to the accessibility of these rights to the population as a 
whole: property rights system may work well for the economic elite and remain deficient for 
the others (Sonin, 2003). This may in turn have critical implications for the extent and 
performance of the entrepreneurial sector (De Soto, 2001). Property rights have further 
implications for financial issues. One of the immediate benefits from the access to the formal 
property rights system is that it can create a basis for financial contracts and a virtuous circle 
of entrepreneurship, creation of assets and finance (Ibid.). Thus, property rights and finance 
form the two key, mutually reinforcing blocks of the effective market economy system 
supporting entrepreneurial entry. 
 
2.2  Existing empirical findings on the determinants of entrepreneurial activity 
While using a different methodology, a number of earlier studies provide both a basis 
and a motivation for the development of our research. The six main studies vary considerably 
in their measures of entrepreneurial activity, institutional variables, methods and results and 
the differences are summarized in Table 1.  
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 Klapper et al. (2006) build on the Djankov et al. (2002) study by measuring the direct 
impact of entry costs. Specifically, they analyse the effect of entry regulation (in terms of 
entry costs) on the creation of new firms. Their study focuses on incorporated companies and 
measures the effects of entry costs in terms of complying with bureaucratic requirements for 
incorporation. The Amadeus data set is used to compare the entry of incorporated firms in 34 
Western and East European countries and include institutional variables, such as entry cost, 
property rights protection and employment rights as well as measures related to the financial 
and fiscal aspects of the policy environment. Their results indicate the rate of new 
corporation creation in industries that tend to be high-entry is relatively lower in countries 
with higher entry costs.  
Desai et al. (2003) draw on the same dataset, aggregating company level data to 
produce industry level indicators as the units of analysis to study the effects of institutional 
indicators on entry. These indicators include: a measure of start-up procedures (from 
Djankov et al. 2002), a corruption indicator (from Transparency International), an index of 
labour regulations (from Botero et al, 2004), an index measuring the independence of courts 
(from the World Bank), a formalism index of the court system (from Djankov et al. 2003) 
and a measure of property rights protection (from the World Economic Forum). The latter 
three dimensions are strongly correlated, as property rights protection is weak if the courts 
are not independent and efficient, so they are often merged into one property rights indicator. 
In order to address the issue of multicollinearity, Desai et al enter each institutional indicator 
into a separate regression. Their key result, which is not inconsistent with Klapper et al. 
(2006), i is that lower rates of entry pertain in the Central and East European (post-Soviet) 
countries. 
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 Demirguc-Kunt et al. (2006) also focus on incorporated firms, but adopt a different 
methodology and use a different dataset. Instead of looking at industry averages, they 
combine country level institutional explanatory variables with firm-level data. Discrete 
response models are used to investigate which factors affect the likelihood for companies to 
be incorporated. Utilising company data from the World Business Environment Survey and 
country level institutional indicators, they find that developed financial systems, efficient 
bankruptcy procedures, lower regulation of corporate entry, relatively lower corporate taxes 
in comparison with personal income taxes, and English, German and Scandinavian legal 
origin increase the likelihood for firms to be incorporated. 
Taking a different approach, and focusing on entrepreneurs rather than just 
incorporated firms, Wennekers et al. (2005) and Van Stel et al. (2007) utilise GEM to 
explore the relationship between entrepreneurship levels, economic development and 
institutional variables. Wennekers et al. (2005) aggregate the data from each country into a 
country level mean value employing nascent entrepreneurship rates by country  as their unit 
of analysis and using 2002 GEM data from 36 countries. The explanatory variables to capture 
institutional variation include income per capita (purchasing power parity), variables 
measuring demographics (population growth and education), legal origin (former centralised 
command economy origins) and institutions (fiscal legislation, social security system and 
administrative requirements for starting a new business). Their results indicate that there is a 
positive effect of population growth on entrepreneurship development and confirm Desai et 
al. (2003) in that countries with formerly centrally planned economy origins significantly 
display lower levels of entrepreneurship development. In terms of institutions, they find a 
negative effect of social security but a positive effect of tax revenues as a percentage of GDP 
on nascent entrepreneurship. They point out that the latter result may be consistent either 
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 with incentives for tax avoidance / evasion or with high-tax countries spending more on 
infrastructure providing a better environment for new firms. Their results also indicate that 
individuals undertaking entrepreneurial activity in higher income countries are more likely to 
be exploiting an opportunity rather than driven to entrepreneurship out of necessity. 
Van Stel et al. (2007) analyse the effect of a particular set of institutions, business 
regulations, on nascent entrepreneurs and young businesses (defined as less than 42 months 
old). Nascent entrepreneurs are further categorised as those driven by opportunities or by 
necessity to start up a new business. They draw on a broader country range of GEM data 
(2002 - 2005 for 39 countries) and also base their analysis on aggregate mean values. Their 
measurement of business regulations is drawn from the World Bank’s Doing Business 
indicators and uses five categories: (1) starting a business, (2) hiring and firing workers, (3) 
obtaining credit, (4) paying taxes and (5) closing a business. Their results indicate that 
minimum capital requirements and labour market rigidity have a negative effect while private 
bureau coverage
ii (i.e. availability of credit information) has a positive effect on nascent 
entrepreneurship rates. They also show that countries with more nascent entrepreneurs tend 
to have more young businesses, supporting the notion that more nascent entrepreneurs 
translates into more actual entrepreneurship. GDP growth is found to have a positive effect 
on opportunity but no significant effect on necessity entrepreneurship.  
Finally, Klapper et al. (2007) is based on the largest country sample (76 countries), 
utilising the World Bank Entrepreneurship Survey. The database focuses on registered 
businesses only, and, as the authors note, it is not a legal obligation to register some forms of 
businesses in some countries. Not surprisingly, in contrast to studies based on more 
encompassing GEM data, the authors find a positive association between registration rates 
and income per capita: more formalisation and better coverage of registration of businesses is 
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 characteristic of wealthier countries. The strongest result on determinants of registration rates 
relates to the positive impact of finance. However, as the authors are aware, using country 
averages, one cannot rule out reverse causality, as a greater number of registered companies 
alleviate informational asymmetries between providers of finance and businesses, perhaps 
leading to standardisation of lending procedures, and therefore creating better conditions for 
the development of the financial sector.  
Table 1 summarises these studies in terms of the data sets used, the dependent 
variables chosen, their main outcomes and their estimation model limitations. 
Multicollinearity and omitted variables pose an important limitation in all. Two run separate 
regressions for each institutional indicator in order to address the problem of 
multicollinearity. This is a reliable exploratory methodology, which may help in rejecting 
irrelevant factors but does not provide insights as to the comparative impact of each of the 
significant factors. It may also lead to spurious results; when a variable is used which is 
strongly correlated with an omitted variable, the resulting significance is questionable. Indeed 
Acemoglu (2005) criticises this approach, arguing that the correlation between different 
institutional variables makes the results on individual dimensions questionable due to the 
problem of correlation with the omitted dimensions.  
Moreover, for the country level studies, simultaneity bias (reverse causality) is a 
serious issue. Only Demirguc-Kunt et al. (2006) avoid this problem by combining individual 
level outcomes with country level variables
iii. This is the methodology we adopt, while 
focusing on the more general concept of entrepreneurial entry based on GEM. 
 
------------------------------------------- 





2.3. Key lessons from the literature: property rights and the size of the state sector  
In this section we summarize briefly the lessons from the empirical and theoretical 
literature that we have discussed so far. One can model potential entrepreneurs as 
maximizing their expected return when making a decision to start new ventures (Casson, 
1982). In contexts where institutions are functioning effectively, risks primarily stem from 
the nature of the ventures themselves and the characterstics of the individuals’ involved 
(Schumpeter, 1934; Kirzner, 1973). However, in a developing economy context, institutions 
may not provide sufficient underpinning to the functioning of the market economy and thus 
will influence both the potential returns from entrepreneurial activity and the variance around 
that possible income stream. We focus on two specific aspects of the inter-relationship 
between entrepreneurial activity and institutions, which have been found to be among the 
most important (Johnson et al., 2002; Dermirgus-Kunt et al., 2006; Klapper et al., 2006). The 
first is the system of property rights, which ensure that entrepreneurs can recoup the rewards 
to which they are contracted. Weaknesses in property rights increase the riskiness of 
entrepreneurial activity. The second concerns the welfare and tax system, which determines 
both the opportunity cost and the net financial return to entrepreneurial activity. 
 De Soto (2001), argues that the lack of well-defined and efficient system of 
registering, protecting and trading of property rights may be the key obstacle that prevents 
the entrepreneurs from utilising and combining the potentially productive assets and turning 
them into real capital: ‘Principal problem is not the lack of entrepreneurship (…). What the 
poor lack is easy access to property mechanisms that could legally fix the economic potential 
of their assets so they could be used to produce, secure or guarantee greater value in the 
expanded market’ (De Soto 2001: 46). Rodrik (2000) , also pinpoints the essential role of 
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 property rights, in his analysis of the five key market supporting institutions: ‘It stands to 
reason that an entrepreneur would not have the incentive to accumulate and innovate unless 
s/he has adequate control over the return to the assets that are thereby produced or 
improved’ (Rodrik 2000:6). 
Recent theories of entrepreneurship emphasise that “the institution of private property 
... has an important psychological dimension that enhances our feelings of ... internal control 
and personal agency, and it thereby promotes entrepreneurial alertness” (Harper 2003, p. 74). 
For entrepreneurship, it is also important that the property rights not only guarantee the status 
quo but also include the ‘find and keep’ component, which is essential for the aspects of 
entrepreneurship related to discovery, innovation and creation of new resources (Harper 
2003). Unlike Acemoglu and Johnson (2005), we regard property rights as difficult to 
separate from contracts rights, especially, when we include the rights of use and 
transferability; the crucial ones for entrepreneurial activity.  The relationship between 
property rights and entrepreneurship has been considered previously in the literature, but the 
results have been ambiguous. The property rights indicator was not found to be significant by 
Klapper et al. (2006), Desai et al. (2003) or Demirguc-Kunt et al. (2006), possibly because of 
their focus on incorporated companies. However, Johnson et al. (2002) show that the 
insecurity of property rights may be a key factor deterring investment in small manufacturing 





Secondly, we consider the impact of the state sector on entrepreneurship. In general, a 
larger state sector will militate against entrepreneurial activity, both via state revenues and 
expenditures. Taxes and welfare provision may affect entrepreneurial entry via their direct 
impact on expected returns to entrepreneurial activity and its opportunity cost. High and 
increasing marginal level of taxes may weaken incentives for opportunity-driven 
entrepreneurship by reducing potential gains, while high levels of welfare support provide 
alternative sources of income and therefore by increasing the alternative wage may reduce 
the net expected return to entrepreneurship. Taken together, this implies that a larger state 
sector will drive out entrepreneurial activity. 
 
3. Institutional Indicators and Factor Analysis 
In this section, we describe the measures employed in our empirical work to quantify 
the institutional environment and the methodologies used to tackle multicollinearity. Our 
approach is to apply a data reduction technique – factor analysis – and we report the findings 
from this methodology. In the next section, we consider the remaining data used in our study.  
There is no single universally accepted set of indicators of cross-country institutional 
quality, but we have identified the Heritage Foundation / Wall Street Journal set of 
institutional indicators as a reliable source which offers a broad number of and provides the 
largest number of countries and years. The Heritage Foundation offers fifty independent 
indicators grouped into ten broad institutional categories related to: trade policy, fiscal 
burden (including marginal tax rates), size of the government sector (government spending) 
in the economy, monetary policy (control of inflation), constraints on foreign investment, 
direct state involvement in banking and finance and regulatory restrictions that go beyond 
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 prudential supervision, regulation of labour (employment and wages)
iv , security of property 
rights, business regulations (which include entry barriers), corruption. These ten categories 
are intended to outline the institutional factors that taken together determine the degree to 
which economic actors are free to respond to changing world market conditions (Beach and 
Kane (2007)).  
 “Property rights” in the Heritage Foundation index comprises seven areas: (1) 
Freedom from government influence over judicial system; (2) Commercial code defining 
contracts; (3) Sanctioning of foreign arbitration of contract disputes; (4) Government 
expropriation of property; (5) Corruption within the judiciary; (6) Delays in receiving judicial 
decisions and/or enforcement, and (7) Legally granted and protected private property. Thus, 
consistent with De Soto (2001) and Barzel (1997), the indicator of property rights protection 
includes both low risk of expropriation and security of contracts, and remains closely related 
to the slightly more general concept of the “rule of law.” 
We have noted that multicollinearity is a serious issue in institutional analysis, 
because of the abundance of closely related indicators. Theory can guide us on the relative 
importance of different institutional dimensions but is of limited assistance when considering 
the choice of alternative measures of related institutional features. We apply factor analysis to 
tackle the problem, utilizing the entire dataset (1995-2008 including 164 countries and nine 
indicators) available on the Heritage Foundation’s website.
v By ordering the extracted factors 
according to the magnitude of their eigenvalues we produced the following screeplot. 
 
-------------------------------- 




There is a distinct break after the second factor, as the eigenvalue drops from 1.30 to 0.27. 
Accordingly, following the standard practice (see Russell, 2002; Pett et al., 2003; Costello 
and Osborne, 2005) we retain the first two factors.
vi Given we have no reasons to expect that 
the correlation between the factors is zero, we next apply oblique rotation (via oblimin 




FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE 
-------------------------------- 
 
Figure 2 reveals the pivotal role of the property rights dimension among the Heritage 
Foundation indicators.  The property rights indicator has the highest loadings on the first 
factor, which itself explains most of the institutional variance. It links closely with freedom 
from corruption that has the second highest loadings on the first factor, as well as with 
business freedom (the third highest loading), which is related to freedom of entry and exit. 
Most of other institutional indicators are clustered around these. We therefore label the first 
factor as “rule of law”.  
However, Figure 2 shows that ”fiscal freedom” and the size of the government 
spending in GDP dimensions should be best considered separately from the other institutional 
factors. They cluster together forming the second factor that we label “limited state sector”. 
While the impact of taxes and the impact of government spending (including welfare) on 
entrepreneurship can be separated conceptually, they are obviously connected empirically via 
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 the size of the state budget, and in practice their independent effects prove difficult to 
identify. The factor scores for countries in our sample are reported in Figure 3 below. 
 
-------------------------------- 
FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE 
-------------------------------- 
 
We find that the Scandinavian countries, Belgium, Netherlands and Germany are 
located in the upper left corner with a strong rule of law and an extensive state sector. In 
contrast, Hong Kong and Singapore are the two economies which combine the rule of law 
with a small state sector. The Anglo-Saxon economies are between these cases, with high 
quality institutions and a middle size range of state sector. In contrast, Latin American 
countries (with the notable exception of Chile), Russia, China and India are all countries 
where the size of government spending and taxation remains relatively low, but rule of law is 
weak. The weak negative correlation between the two factors is probably driven by the fact 
that there are no countries in the lower left corner of the graph. Thus, paradoxically, a large 
state sector cannot be built where basic institutional quality is low, because the latter affects 
the state’s capacity to collect taxes. 
  Another way of interpreting the weak negative correlation between the two factors is 
to note that factor 1, which we have denoted ‘rule of law”, actually represents both property 
rights and corruption. Once we focus on corruption, our results can be stated in the terms of 
the theoretical model by Acemoglu and Verdier (2000), who argue that while state 
intervention may have a positive overall impact, some corruption may be unavoidable to 
achieve an efficient outcome in the feasible range. On our graph, this would imply a positive 
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 correlation between the two factors, at least over some section of the distribution: a larger 
state sector would be associated with greater corruption leading to an ordering of 
observations along the diagonal. However, this is not what we observe.  Rather, the findings 
in Figure 3 are more consistent with Hellman et al. (2003): in the countries with a large state 
sector, corruption may be lower, perhaps because special interests become directly embedded 
within the state sector (see Mickiewicz (2009)). 
Acemoglu and Verdier’s perspective is motivated by the efficiency theory of 
institutions, which assumes that institutional outcomes have some traits of efficient feasible 
solutions. In contrast, Botero et al. (2004) argue that the institutional outcome may also be 
explained by political theories (assuming some entrenched special interests) and by 
institutional inertia (as represented by legal origin). We noted above that inefficient economic 
institutions may persist and both political factors and institutional continuity can contribute to 
the explanation. 
 
4. Data and Estimation Methodology 
In this section we consider the remaining data used in our empirical work and describe our 
estimation techniques. 
 
4.1 Individual Level Data 
Our individual level data are drawn from GEM and are generated through surveys creating 
stratified samples of at least 2,000 individuals per country. The sample is drawn from the 
whole working age population in each participating country and therefore captures both 
entrepreneurs and non-entrepreneurs. While data on business ownership and individual 
business financing is included, entrepreneurial activity is primarily viewed as new, nascent 
18 
 start-up activity. Nascent entrepreneurs are defined as those individuals between the ages of 
18 – 64 years who have ‘taken some action’ toward creating a new business in the past year, 
and expect to own a share of those business they are starting, which must not have paid any 
wages or salaries for more than three months (Minniti et al., 2005b). In contrast, established 
entrepreneurs are defined as individuals who own or manage a company and have paid wages 
or salaries for more than 42 months (ibid.). 
We utilise all available GEM data from the 1998-2004 surveys. Our survey database 
includes the 44 individual country samples, as reported on Figure 3. Additional data details 
are reported in Table 2.  
 
4.2. Control variables 
Apart from the institutional variables discussed above, we control for a number of 
indicators of economic development as well as various personal characteristics of 
entrepreneurs that might affect entrepreneurial entry. Commencing with cross- country 
characteristics, a number of studies have documented the existence of a relationship between 
entrepreneurial activity and economic development (Wennekers et al. 2005; Carree et al. 
2002; Acs et al. 1994), for which we control by including a measure of per capita GDP 
(purchasing power parity).  
In addition, the link between the overall (cyclical) economic performance in a country 
and incentives to entrepreneurial entry are often discussed. The problem is that two 
conflicting effects may occur, and it is difficult to decide a priori which has the stronger 
impact. On the one hand, entrepreneurship may be ‘recession-push’, as the opportunity cost 
of entrepreneurial entry is lower when existing firms are not expanding, which reduces new 
job openings. On the other hand, there may be also ‘prosperity-pull’ effect; that is, a growing 
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 economy leads to larger expected gains from entrepreneurial activity (Parker, 2004). The rate 
of economic growth measured by GDP growth has been shown by Van Stel et al. (2007) to 
have a positive effect on the rate of opportunity entrepreneurship. Though in our models we 
focus on new firm entry more generally, we include GDP growth as a control variable.   
The scale of entrepreneurial activity is also influenced by the supply of finance. An 
efficient system of property rights may be a necessary but is not a sufficient condition for a 
well-developed financial system. One can find countries which have implemented a relatively 
efficient system of property rights, while their financial system remains underdeveloped, for 
example some of the countries that switched from a command to market economy. In these 
cases, entrepreneurs may be unable to carry through their projects, either because the cost of 
finance is too high or because they face binding financial constraints (Gros and Steinherr, 
2004; Mickiewicz, 2005). The findings on this issue in the empirical literature are mixed. 
Grilo and Irigoyen (2006) report a negative effect of the perception of lack of finance on the 
probability of being self-employed, while Grilo and Thurik (2005) are unable to identify any 
effect. The ambiguity may result from the fact that entrepreneurs often substitute financial 
resources from the informal sector for those from the formal sector (Korosteleva and 
Mickiewicz, 2008).   
We also control for individual differences in access to finance. Evans and Jovanovic 
(1989) show that, due to capital constraints, there is a positive relationship between the 
probability of becoming self-employed and the assets of the entrepreneur. Similarly, Evans 
and Leighton (1989) show that the exploitation of entrepreneurial opportunities is more 
common when people have greater financial capital (see also: Hurst and Lusardi (2004)). We 
capture some aspects of the individual-specific financial constraints by using a dummy 
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 variable, which indicates if a potential entrepreneur had been providing funds for business 
financing in the past.  
It is also important to control for individual factor supply characteristics, including 
gender, age and human capital.  Most research indicates that men have a higher probability of 
becoming entrepreneurs than women (Minniti et al. 2005a; Verheul et al. 2006); in an 
analysis based on GEM data, men were found to be about twice as likely to be involved in 
entrepreneurial activities than women (Reynolds et al. 2002). The relationship between 
entrepreneurship and age is typically found to be inverse-U -shaped, with the maximum   
found at a relatively young age (Levesque and Minniti, 2006). 
Findings on human capital are an important area of research in terms of its 
relationship to entrepreneurship; though the results for developed economies measured in 
terms of education are mixed. Robinson and Sexton (1994) and Cooper and Dunkelberg 
(1987) find that the decision to become self-employed is influenced by education while the 
results of Delmar and Davidsson (2000) and Davidsson and Honig (2003) show an education 
effect for nascent entrepreneurs. More recent evidence compiled by Parker (2004) suggests 
that on average, entrepreneurs tend to be more educated than non- entrepreneurs.   
Wennekers et al. (2005) found a significant and positive relationship between the 
number of incumbent business owners and entrepreneurial start-ups. Role models may for 
example help by providing information, which alleviates both uncertainty and the cost of 
starting the business (Minniti, 2005). We therefore also control for whether the potential 
nascent entrepreneur knows any other entrepreneurs. Another factor that may affect start-up 
rates in different economic settings is whether the entrepreneur is employed while starting 
their business.  
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 Definitions of all the variables and descriptive statistics for all variables, including 
nascent entrepreneurship are presented in Table 2.  
 
------------------------------------------- 
INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 
------------------------------------------- 
  
4.3 Framework for analysis 
If i denotes individuals, j denotes countries and t denotes time, we estimate an equation of the 
form : 
entijt = f(Strength of Property Rightsjt, , Level of Welfare  Provision and Taxationjt, 
GDP/capitajt, GDP growth ratejt, Availability of Financejt, Individual Level Controlsjit), 
 
where ent is a dummy variable denoting  whether or not an individual in a particular country 
at a particular date is engaged in nascent start up activity.  We use Probit as our estimator, 
reporting robust standard errors. We allow for the possibility that the observations are not 
independent for each country-year sample in our dataset and this is reflected in the estimated 





5.  Discussion of Results 
 
------------------------------------------------ 




We commence in Table 3 by reporting a variety of regressions which contain the two 
factors derived in section 3 as measures of the strength of property rights and the level of 
welfare provision and taxation. Four models are reported. The first is the simplest case while 
model 2 attempts to control for non-linearities in the specification of the size of the formal 
financial sector. In the latter two models, we consider possible non-linearities with respect to 
the level of development by restricting the sample to countries with GDP per capita up to the 
90
th and 80
th percentile respectively. The experiments to exclude higher GDP per capita 
countries are motivated by the fact that entrepreneurial entry decreases with the level of 
development. However, the effect is non-linear: the negative marginal effect decreases with 
the level of per capita income.
ix One should note, that as we include institutional indicators in 
all specifications, the effect of development captures some additional influences, like 
propensity to risk taking, which may be associated with the overall level of wealth. In turn, 
institutional variables come with the expected signs, albeit with variance in their levels of 
significance. In particular, the impact of  the rule of law becomes less significant at higher 
levels of development. To see this, one may notice that in Models 1 and 2, the impact of the 
first factor (rule of law) remains insignificant. However, the impact of rule of law becomes 
significant in model 3 using the same specification but removing the top 10% of observations 
corresponding to the richest countries in our sample. This conclusion is not sensitive to a 
particular choice of a cut-off point. When we eliminate the top 20% of observations in terms 
of GDP per capita in model 4, it is unaffected.  
The results are more straightforward for the size of the government. Factor 2 (limited 
state sector) remains the most significant macro-level variable, being positive and highly 
significant in every specification.  
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 We now turn to the results on the impact of the scale of the private sector finance. 
When entered in the linear form in model 1, the size of the credit supply to private sector is 
insignificant. However, as noted above, at low levels of development, formal finance may be 
initially crowding out informal finance. Allowing for nonlinearity in model 2, we see that the 
initial impact of the credit to private sector is negative and than becomes positive, producing 
a U-shaped relationship with both terms significant at the 99% level. Interestingly, in direct 
contrast to the results on property rights, the significance is driven primarily by countries at 
higher level of development. This can be seen from the fact, that credit provision becomes 
insignificant once we eliminate the richest countries in Models 3 and 4. 
To summarise, we have shown that the rule of law is an important determinant of the 
entrepreneurial entry, but its importance is lower for countries at the highest level of 
development. In contrast, access to formal finance is less important at the initial stages of 
development but grows in importance with GDP per capita. 
  The results with respect to the control variables largely conform with our 
expectations. We confirm that men and current owners are significantly more likely to start 
new businesses, as are people who provided finance as business angels in the past.  We also 
confirm the relevance of business networks: individuals who know other entrepreneurs are 
significantly more likely to start a new business. Human capital as measured by post-
secondary and higher education has a significantly positive impact on entrepreneurial entry. 
Finally we confirm significant quadratic effect for age in our regression models, implying 
that in the relevant range older people are less likely to become entrepreneurs. 
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 6. Conclusions 
 
We have found that the strong protection of property rights plays a pivotal role in the 
institutional environment conducive to entrepreneurial activity, especially at lower levels of 
development. Most of the other institutional indicators, including freedom from corruption, 
lack of entry barriers and absence of other regulatory barriers cluster around property rights 
forming our Factor 1 (‘Rule of Law’). This is consistent with De Soto: ‘Marx would probably 
be shocked to find how in developing countries much of the teeming mass does not consist of 
oppressed legal proletarians but of oppressed extralegal small entrepreneurs’ (De Soto 
2001: 229). However, the variation in “the rule of law“has less impact  in developed 
countries and, as documented by Figure 3, these are the countries where the rule of law is 
already high.   
We also identify a strong and robust negative effect from the size of the state sector 
on entrepreneurial activity and this holds throughout the full range of income per capita in 
our sample. However, we recognise that this result abstracts from some important issues; the 
characteristics of the state sector as well as its size are important. Baumol et al. (2007) argue 
against welfare provision based on employment status as it discourages a movement from 
employment towards entrepreneurship. Thus, some of the key policy discussions are not only 
about the size of government spending but also about its design. 
The relationship between the level of development and entrepreneurship is negative 
and non-linear; a logarithmic function performs best with our data. Access to finance is also 
found to matter for the entrepreneurial activity. However, when the level of development is 
taken into account we obtain the opposite results to those on property rights: formal finance 
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 is less important in poor countries, but becomes increasingly significant at the higher stages 
of development. 
Our results contain interesting implications for policy makers as well as directions for 
further research. We have found that that the promotion of individual choices to become 
entrepreneurs is heavily dependent on two key aspects of the business environment: the rule 
of law and the size of the state sector.  Moreover, priorities with respect to the provision of 
finance may be conditional on the level of development (Acs and Szerb (2009)). These 
results suggest that policymakers might benefit from focusing their attention on the elements 
of the institutional environment that are most critical at a given level of development in their 
efforts to enhance entrepreneurial activity.  
However, our most consistent result concerns the negative impact of the state sector 
(comprising in our second factor the level of taxation and the extent of welfare provision) on 
entrepreneurial activity. It would seem that at every level of development, higher rates of 
taxation reduces the incentives to be entrepreneurial rather than follow other forms of work 
while higher welfare provision raises the opportunity cost of entrepreneurial activity. Policies 
to increase the fiscal role of the state in the economy are therefore in direct conflict with 
aspirations to create a more entrepreneurial society. 
 
26 
 Future research might wish to pay greater attention in developing both theory and 
empirical work to non-linearities, especially concerning effects from various measures of the 
level of development. Further effort to find better institutional measures should result in 
sharper policy prescription, but our results suggest that all the dimensions of protection of 
property rights matter, and these include a well-functioning judicial system protecting 
security of contracts and transactions between individuals and firms, an effective system of 
registering property and low risk of expropriation by government action. Property rights 
should be seen as important in entrepreneurship-oriented development strategies. Our results 
also suggest why their significance has been largely overlooked: most research on 
entrepreneurship is concerned with developed countries, where we have found that impact of 
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 Table 1. Summary of existing research on institutions and entrepreneurship development 
    Klapper et al. (2006)  Desai et al. (2003)  Demirguc-Kunt et al. (2006) 
Data set used 
 




Industry level rates of creation of incorporated firms 
 
Industry level rates of creation of 
incorporated firms 
Individual level indicator variable related to 
incorporated form 
Institutional variables included:  •  Entry costs (incorporation procedures) 
•  Property right protection 
•  Employment rights 
•  Financial system development 
•  Tax disadvantage 
•  Legal origin 
•  Entry costs (incorporation 
procedures) 
•  Corruption 
•  Labour regulations 
•  Independence of banks 
•  Court system 
•  Property right protection 
•  Legal origin 
•  Entry cost (incorporation procedures) 
•  Financial system development 
•  Tax disadvantage 
•  Legal origin 
•  Bankruptcy procedures 
•  Legal protection in solving disputes 
•  Share of unofficial economy 
•  Protection of shareholders rights 
 
Outcomes:  •  New corporation creation in industries that tend 
to be high entry are relatively lower in 
countries with higher entry costs; 
•  Entry costs have a greater effect in richer 
countries than in poorer countries 
•  Entry costs tend to be lower in countries with 
English or Scandinavian legal origins. 
 
•  Communist legal origin has 
negative effect. 
•  Communist legal origin has negative effect 
•  Financial sector development and bankruptcy 
procedures has positive effect 
•  Tax disadvantage makes incorporation less 
likely 
•  Entry costs have significant negative effect 
Handling of multicollinearity in 
institutional indicators: 
•  Entering each institutional indicator into a 
separate regression 
•  Entering each institutional 
indicator into a separate regression. 
•  Factor analysis; using extracted factors instead 
of original variables. 
  38  Table 1. Summary of existing research on institutions and entrepreneurship development (continued) 
       Wennekers et al. (2005)  Van Stel et al. (2007)  Klapper et al. (2007)
Data set used 
 
Global Entrepreneurship Monitor  Global Entrepreneurship Monitor  WB Entrepreneurship Survey   
Dependent variable 
 
Country level rates of nascent 
entrepreneurship 
Country level rates of nascent entrepreneurship an
young business rate 
 
Country level rates of creation of incorporated firms 
 
 
Institutional variables included:  •  Entry costs (administrative 
requirements for starting a new 
business) 
•  Fiscal legislation 
•  Social security 
•  Former communist country economic 
origin 
 
Variables in 5 categories: 
•  Starting a business 
•  Hiring and firing workers 
•  Getting credit 
•  Paying taxes 
•  Closing a business 
•  Entry costs (incorporation procedures) 
•  Employment rights 
•  Financial system development 
•  Quality of state governance 
 
 
Outcomes:  •  Higher social security expenditure has 
a negative effect; 
•  Higher government tax revenues have 
a positive effect; 
•  Communist legal origin has a 
negative effect. 
•  Minimum capital requirements have negative 
effect;  
•  Labour market rigidity has a negative effect;
•  Countries with more nascent entrepreneurs als
have more young businesses; 
•  GDP growth rates have a positive effect on 
opportunity entrepreneurship; 
•  Private bureau coverage has a  positiv
effect.   
•  Financial system matters for per capita entry rate,  but 
significance is not robust (sensitive to estimation 
method) 
•  Entry procedures matter for entry rates per capita, but 
significance is not robust (sensitive to estimation 





Handling of multicollinearity in 
institutional indicators: 
•  General to specific: excluding 
insignificant variables.  
•  General to specific: excluding insignificant 
variables. 
•  Applying different estimation methods (GEE, GLS) and 
different definition of dependent variable to check for 
robustness 
 
  39 Table 2. Summary Statistics 






.       
Min Max
Entrepreneurial entry (start-up)  503466 0.03 0.18 0.00 1.00
Male 503466 0.47 0.50 0.00 1.00
Owner/man. of exist. Business  503466 0.05 0.22 0.00 1.00
Business angel in past 3 years  501983 0.03 0.16 0.00 1.00
Knows entrepreneurs in past 2 years  408828 0.35 0.48 0.00 1.00
In employment at time of survey  484814 0.49 0.50 0.00 1.00
Education: secondary or more  460982 0.67 0.47 0.00 1.00
Education: postsec. or more  460982 0.32 0.47 0.00 1.00
Education: higher  460982 0.08 0.26 0.00 1.00
Age 471037 42.97 16.99 1.00 104.00
Annual GDP growth rate  503466 2.95 2.45 -10.89 10.06
Log GDP pc (ppp)  503466 10.04 0.65 6.69 10.75
Rule of law (factor 1 score)  503466 1.26 0.75 -0.87 2.28
Limited size of the government (factor 2 score) 
 
503466 -0.88 1.17 -3.28 1.71
Credit to priv. sector / GDP 500583 108.80 44.85 6.88 231.08
  40 41 
                  
               
                 
                     
                         
             
           
     
         
         
   
             
Table 3. Estimation results using factor scores 
      (1)   (2) (3) (4)
Benchmark Non-linear without  highest  without  highest 
          credit 
 
      10% of GDP pc 
   
  20% of GDP pc 
     
















   
Male 0.22 *** 0.02 0.22 *** 0.02 0.21 *** 0.02 0.21 *** 0.02
Owner/man. of exist. busin.  -0.05  †  0.03 -0.06 †  0.03 -0.07  *  0.03 -0.07 †  0.04
Business angel in past 3 y 
 
0.42  *** 0.03   0.42 *** 0.03   0.41  *** 0.03   0.41 *** 0.03
Knows  entrepreneurs
 
0.52 *** 0.02 0.52 *** 0.02 0.50 *** 0.02 0.49 *** 0.02
In  employment 0.14 *** 0.03 0.13 *** 0.03 0.15 *** 0.03 0.16 *** 0.04
Education: second. or more  0.05    0.04   0.04   0.04   0.03    0.04   0.03   0.04
Education: postsec. or more  0.11  *** 0.02   0.11 *** 0.02   0.09  *** 0.02   0.07 **  0.03
Education: higher 
 
0.09  *  0.04   0.07 †  0.04 0.11  **  0.04 0.12 ***  0.04
Age 0.01  0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01  0.01 0.01 0.01
Age squared  -0.00  †  0.00    -0.00 †  0.00    -0.00  †  0.00    -0.00 †  0.00
Annual GDP growth rate  -0.01     0.01    -0.00    0.01    0.00     0.01    0.00    0.01
Log GDP pc (ppp)  -0.11  *  0.04   -0.09 †  0.05    
   
           
-0.12  *  0.05 -0.11 †  0.06
Rule of law  0.03    0.05   0.05   0.05   0.08  †  0.05 0.10 * 0.05
Limited  state  sector 0.15 *** 0.03 0.12 *** 0.02 0.14 *** 0.03 0.17 *** 0.03
Credit to priv. sector / GDP  0.00    0.00   -0.01 **  0.00   0.00    0.00   0.00   0.00
Credit to priv. sector squared              0.00 **  0.00    0.00     0.00    0.00    0.00
Constant  -1.07         
           
               









  -0.89 *  0.44
 
  -1.07 * 0.47
  Number  of  observations 360697  360697 325786  290741
Wald Chi squared  3576.70  ***
 
    3737.84 ***
 
    3159.63  ***
 





-52557  -52409 -45203  -40505.6
Pseudo  R  squared 0.1104  0.1129 0.1156  0.1179
 Key: *** significant at 0.001; ** significant at 0.01; * significant at 0.05; † significant at 0.1 
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i Entrepreneurship is a multidimentional concept (see Acs and Szerb, 2009) and our results may not apply to 
measures other than entry.We motivate our focus by the work of Lumpkin and Dess (1996) who state ‘the 
essential act of entrepreneurship is new entry’ (1996: 136). See also Acs (2006). 
ii  This variable measures the existence and extensiveness of private firms or non-governmental organizations 
that maintain databases on the creditworthiness of borrowers (Van Stel et al. 2007:178). 
iii  However, their study is limited due to a narrow focus on incorporation. 
iv This indicator is available since 2005. 
v As accessed in February 2008.  Since labour freedom is available from 2005 only, it was not included. 
However, we verified it did not affect the results significantly. When we run factor analysis for a shorter period 
but with freedom of labour included, , the first two factors still explain most of the variance, and loadings of 
labour freedom are not high on either of them. Empirically, labour freedom is negatively correlated with the size 
of the government spending and therefore its impact is difficult to separate where the size of the government is 
taken into account (see Aidis et al., 2007). 
vi However, retaining two factors come at cost of high uniqueness value for the trade freedom indicator (at 0.71), 
i.e. this variable is not well explained by the extracted factors. Generally however, sampling adequacy is high: 
overall Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure is 0.85. 
vii As argued by Costello and Osborne (2005), orthogonal rotation is not utilising all available information. 
Moreover, if factors are truly uncorrelated, the results of oblique rotation are very similar to the results of 
orthogonal rotation. In our case the correlation between the two factors after oblique rotation is -0.14. We use 
oblimin method following recommendation by Fabrigar et al. (1999) and Russell (2002). We also applied 
promax. We verified that the results based on the two are almost indistinguishable for our data. 
viii  It has important effects for the significance levels we report: without this correction, practically any country 
level variable would be significant, given the sample size. 
ix It is likely that there is a U-shaped relationship between the level of develepment and the entrepreneurial entry 
as postulated by Acs et al. (1994), Carree et al. (2002) and Wennekers et al. (2005). Unfortunately, for our data, 
when we attempt to enter a linear and quadratic GDP per capita term in our specifications, the overall Wald 
statistics for the probit regression becomes problematic. For this reason, we stick to the logarithmic 
transformation.. 
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